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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff-appellant ("Sue" Varallo) and defendant-
appellee ("Bob" Varallo) were married for over 22 years. 
During almost all of the marriage, Sue stayed out of the work 
force to care for Bob and their children, and to manage their 
homes (the Varallos resided in at least nine locations due to 
Bob's military career). Toward the end of the marriage, Sue 
was forced to return to work when Bob lost his civilian job at 
Unisys which payed him over $57,000 per year. 
Bob does not deny that the reason he lost his job was 
because of untruthful or incomplete polygraph answers 
concerning his affair with his brother's wife. Bob also does 
not deny the trial court's finding that after he lost his job 
at Unisys because of his own misconduct, he remained 
voluntarily unemployed, living off Sue's income and his 
military retirement benefits. 
Despite these undisputed facts, Bob contends that Sue 
is not entitled to her share of his retirement benefits earned 
during the marriage (benefits of over $50,000 per year at the 
time of trial), or to any increase in Survivor's Benefit 
Protection (SBP) to replace those benefits when he dies. He 
also contends that Sue is entitled to no alimony, despite the 
fact that Sue's ability to earn income was impaired while she 
was out of the work force caring for their family, that alimony 
is necessary to bring Sue to the standard of living enjoyed by 
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the Varallos during their marriage, and that Bob has the 
ability to pay alimony. Bob also argues that no income should 
be imputed to him, despite his voluntary unemployment. He also 
seeks to avoid contributing to the education of his children. 
Thus, after over 22 years of marriage, Bob contends 
that Sue is entitled to virtually nothing from him. Yet he 
also insists that he is entitled to one half of Sue's already 
minimal retirement benefits, and one half of an account 
consisting solely of funds Sue inherited from her mother. 
These positions are not only inconsistent but also without 
legal support and must be rejected by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BOB'S BRIEF MISCHARACTERIZES IMPORTANT 
FACTS, RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND 
APPLICABLE LAW. 
Preliminarily, it is necessary to correct a number of 
mischaracterizations in Bob's brief. They include: 
1. The trial court did not award Sue any portion of 
Bob's military retirement or disability benefits, which is one 
of the main reasons for Sue's appeal. Thus, Bob's arguments 
that the Court awarded Sue 30% of Bob's gross benefits, 
including the disability portion of these benefits, is simply 
wrong. 
(a) Moreover, all that Sue is asking for on this 
appeal is what she is entitled to, 30% of his "disposable 
monthly retired pay". By statute "disposable monthly retired 
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pay" excludes the disability payment, as well as the SBP 
payment. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) as amended. See, pp. 14-15 of 
Sue's opening brief and Add. "D" thereto. 
(b) Although the Court apparently believed that 
an award of 30% of Bob's military benefits, if made, would be 
based upon the "gross" amount of benefits rather than 
"disposable retired pay", this error benefitted Bob. The two 
"options" presented to the parties were based upon the Court's 
belief that Sue's share of the benefits would be $1,267.50 per 
month, rather than the $1,028 per month she would actually 
receive (as of the time of trial, but subject to subsequent 
cost of living increases). Tr. 186-187 (Add. "A" to Sue's 
opening brief); Sue's opening brief, p. 24. Thus, under Option 
1 (which was not adopted) the trial court would have awarded 
Bob $850 per month in alimony, and required no increase in SBP 
benefits (thereby saving Bob about an additional $280 per 
month) to offset against what the court thought would be an 
award of $1,267.50 per month (rather than $1,028 per month) in 
retirement benefits to Sue. 
2. At the time of trial, amendments to 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1448 permitted SBP protection either voluntarily or by court 
order. 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b)(5)(A) (requiring person electing to 
provide SBP benefits to former spouse to state "whether the 
election is being made pursuant to the requirements of a court 
order") (Add. "E" to Sue's opening brief); Sue's opening brief, 
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p. 19. Bob's brief also makes conflicting statements about his 
position on SBP benefits. At page 24, Bob's brief states: 
The defendant [Bob], by providing the 
maximum survivor's benefit available, is 
providing a type of retirement benefit for 
the plaintiff. This is an equitable and 
fair resolution by the District Court to the 
problem of the division of the defendant's 
retirement fund. 
(Emphasis added) However, on page 27, Bob's brief states: 
"The trial court also erred when it ordered the defendant to 
provide the maximum coverage available under the Survivors 
Benefit Plan." The latter statement appears to be based on an 
erroneous assertion that the trial court had no power to order 
maximum SBP protection. It can. However, the former statement 
establishes that Bob now believes this component of the Order 
to be "equitable and fair", thereby making his acquisition of 
maximum SBP protection voluntary and not court mandated. 
3. Bob argues that the trial court erred in 
directing him to continue payments to a life insurance company 
Bob contended was in receivership. However, the trial court 
made allowance for the prospect of the company's financial 
instability when it expressly ordered that if ". . .owing to 
the financial instability of the insurance company it becomes 
no longer prudent to maintain coverage under the policies. . . 
defendant is ordered to obtain a substitute policy or 
policies. . .with a premium equal to that now paid by 
defendant. . .". 
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4. Page 34 of Bob's brief states: "The plaintiff's 
[Sue's] retirement fund was obtained from her employment with 
the federal government while the parties were married. 
(Tr. 7-8).H In fact, Sue Varallo's undisputed testimony on 
this point, (which begins at Tr. 6) as corrected at page 4 of 
her opening brief, establishes that most of her retirement was 
earned prior to marriage. She worked in federal civil service 
for four and one half years prior to the marriage (including a 
six-month temporary appointment at NASA and four years with the 
Census Bureau), and three and one half years during the 
marriage through the time of trial (one and one half years of 
which were also temporary appointments). At the time of the 
marriage Sue withdrew and contributed to the marital estate the 
retirement income accrued during her four years with the Census 
Bureau. No retirement deductions were made during the 
temporary appointments (and hence no retirement benefits 
accrued during these appointments). The $8,500 that the Court 
ordered the parties to split was the cost to reinstate Sue's 
retirement benefits for the four years she worked for the 
Census Bureau prior to the marriage, and to obtain benefits for 
the periods she worked as a temporary appointee. Tr. 6-8 
(Add. "A" hereto). 
5. At page 9, paragraph 10, Bob's brief states that 
Sue's return to full time work in 1991 was voluntary. In 
reality, Bob told her, "that in order to support our lifestyle 
[she] better get out and find a job". Tr. 7 (Add. "A" hereto). 
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6. At pages 30-31, Bob's brief claims that his $400 
per month child support payment provides Mthe majority of 
support for . . ,Cara". There is no support in the record for 
this statement, and it is false. 
7. For unknown reasons, Bob's brief fails to point 
out that, subsequent to the filing of Sue's opening brief, Sean 
moved in with his father. Thus, the portion of Sue's appeal 
seeking child support for Sean and the right to claim Sean as a 
dependent for tax purposes is moot and will not be argued 
further. 
II. SUE'S SALARY WAS EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT 
OF INCOME THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPUTED 
TO BOB. 
There is no dispute that at the time of trial Bob was 
unemployed, but capable of employment. Any disability he has 
disqualifies him from physical labor only. It did not 
interfere with his prior employment at Unisys, nor would it 
compromise his ability to perform tasks required of those who 
hold office jobs such as Sue's. Tr. 98; Finding of Fact No. 8 
(Add. "B" to Sue's opening brief). Thus, the evidence and 
findings of the trial court were sufficient to establish his 
voluntary unemployment. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 
(Utah App. 1993); See also, Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
The real issue is not whether income should be inputed 
to Bob, but how much. Bob's brief argues that there was no 
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evidence from which such an amount could be determined. 
However, Bob ignores the evidence of Sue's salary, vhich, as 
argued in Sue's opening brief, is the amount of income that 
should be imputed to Bob. 
Bob does not dispute that both have similar 
educational backgrounds, i.e., college B.A. degrees. Bob also 
does not dispute that, if anything, his work experience and 
training should enable him to find a better paying job than 
Sue's. Bob had 30 years experience in the military (retiring 
as a Colonel) and another two years experience with Unisys, and 
no time out of the work force until he lost his job at Unisys 
in 1990. 
In contrast, Sue worked four and one-half years in 
federal civil service prior to the marriage in 1970, and a 
total of only 17 months in temporary civil service positions 
during the marriage (nine months at the beginning of the 
marriage and eight months in 1988) until 1991. Still, she was 
able to land her position with the Bureau of Reclamation in 
1991, paying $3,350 per month at the time of trial. Although 
the trial court may have been correct in finding that Bob could 
not, without retraining, duplicate his salary of over $50,000 a 
year at Unisys, Bob makes no argument as to why he could not 
find a job paying at least what Sue earns, or why that amount 
of income should not be imputed to him. 
Bob cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2) for the 
proposition that only income from the equivalent of one full 
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time job may be used to determine the amount of child support. 
However, the only purpose of that statute is to prevent a 
parent from being required to hold down two jobs in order to 
meet a child support obligation. The statute was not designed 
to protect someone like Bob who chooses to avoid having even 
one job. 
Moreover, Sue does not seek to increase the trial 
court's award of child support (or alimony) based upon imputed 
income. She merely argues that the trial court's failure to 
impute income to Bob led the Court to deprive her of her 3 0% 
interest in Bob's disposable monthly retired pay. However, if 
this Court were to accept Bob's misguided argument (addressed 
further below) that the disability portion of Bob's retirement 
benefit should not have been considered in determining the 
amount of child support and alimony, then Sue would ask that 
income be imputed to Bob for these purposes as well. 
The trial court's indication that it would entertain a 
modification petition if Bob does decide to return to work, 
does not confront the imputation issue. Tr. 198; Finding No. 9 
(Add. "A" and "B", respectively, to Sue's opening brief). This 
arrangement provides Bob with no incentive to return to work. 
He is permitted to live solely off of his retirement benefits, 
earned in part through Sue's efforts and support, while she is 
forced to work in order to approach a standard of living he 
maintains without working. 
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There is no question that the trial court erred in 
failing to impute income to Bob in at least the amount of Sue's 
salary. As will be argued next, once that income is imputed to 
Bob, there is also no question that Sue is entitled to 30% of 
Bob's disposable monthly retired pay. 
III. SUE IS ENTITLED BOTH TO 30% OF BOB'S 
DISPOSABLE MONTHLY RETIRED PAY DURING 
HIS LIFETIME AND TO MAXIMUM SBP 
PROTECTION AFTER HIS DEATH. 
As discussed above, contrary to Bob's argument, Sue is 
seeking 30% of Bob's "disposable monthly retired pay", not 30% 
of his gross retirement benefits, and any error by the trial 
court in using Bob's gross retirement pay in calculating the 
economic consequences of its two options was to Bob's 
advantage. The other arguments Bob advances on the issue of 
the division of his retirement benefits and on SBP benefits 
also are without merit. 
One of these arguments is that the trial court 
correctly ruled that Bob's life expectancy is too uncertain to 
permit a present value calculation of his retirement benefits, 
thereby barring a lump sum distribution. However, as 
demonstrated in Sue's opening brief at pp. 15-17, it is only 
when retirement has not yet occurred, and therefore the amount 
of benefits is unknown, that the present value of these 
benefits may be too speculative to determine. Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
Once retirement has occurred, benefits are fixed and 
the only remaining variable is life expectancy. Courts have 
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long recognized the reliability of mortality tables to assess 
life expectancy, for example in personal injury cases where the 
present value of future lost income is at issue. In a divorce 
context, Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah App, 1990) 
specifically holds that once retirement has occurred, the 
present value of retirement benefits can be determined and made 
part of the property distribution. The spouse may receive his 
or her share of the present value of retirement benefit from 
other marital assets of equivalent value, when available. 
Thus, it is only the present value of Sue's retirement 
benefits that cannot be determined here, because she has not 
yet retired. Although Sue would prefer to receive her 30% 
share of Bob's disposable monthly retired pay on a monthly 
basis as it is paid to him, it is clear that Bob has sufficient 
other assets to pay the $185,000 that represents her share of 
the present value of Bob's disposable monthly retired pay. 
P.Ex. 18; Sue's opening brief, pp. 6,17; Tr. 104 (Add. MA" to 
Sue's opening brief); Finding No. 15 (Add. "BM to Sue's opening 
brief) . 
The only other argument that Bob appears to make 
regarding his retirement benefits is that his obligation to pay 
for the maximum SBP benefit resulted in what should be treated 
as an equitable substitute for the award of Sue's share of his 
retirement benefits. As indicated above, this is a peculiar 
argument because Bob later argues in his brief that the trial 
court erred in ordering maximum SBP protection for Sue. 
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More importantly, SBP benefits are no substitute for 
Sue's share of Bob's retirement benefits. The SBP benefits are 
payable only upon Bob's death, while the retirement benefits 
are payable only during Bob's life. If Sue predeceases Bob, 
she will receive none of the SBP benefits, after already being 
deprived of her rightful share of the retirement benefits. The 
only equitable decision would have been to award Sue both her 
30% share of Bob's disposable monthly retired pay (either in a 
lump sum based on present value, or on a monthly basis) and the 
maximum SBP protection. 
Bob supplements his other SBP arguments with the 
assertions that he and Sue entered into a binding contract that 
Bob would provide Sue with only the minimum SBP protection, and 
that the trial court had no power to change that contract. Not 
only are these assertions without legal support under the SBP 
statute, they also contradict Bob's argument that the maximum 
SBP protection was an equitable tradeoff for Sue's share of 
Bob's retirement benefits. 
Bob's assertions also fail under basic contract law 
principles. Contrary to the statement at page 28 of Bob's 
brief, Sue received no "bargained for consideration" in return 
for reduced SBP benefits. Moreover, any "contract" the parties 
may have made was dependent upon the marriage contract, and was 
terminated when the marriage contract was terminated as the 
result of Bob's philandering. 
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Bob's arguments aside, the trial court made two 
critical errors in its analysis of the military retirement and 
related SBP issues. The first error was in ruling that the 
present value of the retirement benefits could not be 
determined based upon Bob's actuarial life expectancy. The 
second error was in refusing to impute income to Bob, for 
purposes of determining whether Bob could afford to pay both 
Sue's share of his disposable retired pay on a monthly basis, 
along with the monthly payment for maximum SBP protection. 
As shown in Sue's opening brief at pp. 23-25, with a 
salary equal to Sue's, Bob could pay Sue her share of his 
retirement benefits on a monthly basis, pay the maximum monthly 
SBP payment, meet his other existing monthly obligations under 
the Decree (including child support and alimony) and still have 
enough left over to live comfortably. Of course, this scenerio 
would require Bob to return to work, as Sue was required to do. 
IV. EVEN WITHOUT IMPUTATION OF INCOME, THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS AND EXPRESS AND 
IMPLIED FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SUPPORTED THE AMOUNT OF THE ALIMONY AND 
CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED TO SUE. 
Bob's primary argument on the $500 per month alimony 
award to Sue is not that the award was too high, but that the 
trial court's findings were insufficient to support the award. 
However, the record establishes that the trial court considered 
the appropriate factors (i.e., Sue's financial condition and 
needs, Sue's ability to meet those needs, and Bob's ability to 
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pay) and that these factors support the alimony amount 
(assuming no income is imputed to Bob.) 
Although the formal Findings 8 and 9 (Add. "B" to 
Sue's opening brief) do not expressly recite all of the 
necessary factors, the undisputed evidence before the trial 
court, and the court's ruling from the bench (Add. "A" to Sue's 
opening brief), show that the trial court considered these 
factors, and, more importantly, show the analysis that led to 
the ultimate award. This is all that is required by this 
Court's decisions in Hall v. Hall, supra and Hill v. Hill, 
supra. 
Under Hall, express findings are not required either 
as to undisputed issues, or if the express findings can be 
implied from subsidiary findings on disputed issues: 
Unstated findings can be implied if it is 
reasonable to assume that the trial court 
actually considered the controverted 
evidence and necessarily made a finding to 
resolve the controversy, but simply failed 
to record the factual determination it made. 
858 P.2d at 1025. Indeed, for purposes of appellate review, it 
is more important for the trial court to explain its analytical 
processes rather than to merely parrot the magic language of a 
required finding: 
[W]here the court formulates detailed 
subsidiary findings of fact which . . . by 
themselves, show the steps by which the 
court arrived at its apparent conclusion, 
. . . the court's decision . . . will not be 
invalidated . . . . 
Id. 
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In many cases, where a court fails to phrase 
findings in the exact language of the 
statute, the findings nevertheless reflect 
methodical and extensively detailed 
treatment of the facts, which is often more 
insightful and helpful on appeal than a 
shorter, more cursory recitation of the 
exact statutory language would have been. 
Such an approach frequently promotes more 
meaningful appellate review by providing the 
appellate court with insight into the steps 
taken by the trial court in arriving at its 
decision. 
Id. at n.7 (citations omitted). 
Here, in Finding No. 8, the Court expressly found 
that, "in order to maintain the standard of living which the 
parties enjoyed during their marriage, plaintiff [Sue] is in 
need of support . . . in the amount of $500 per month". It was 
undisputed that Sue's standard of living had declined after she 
filed for divorce and she and the children moved out of the 
family home. Tr. 34. See, Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 
542 (Utah 1991) [M. . . usually the needs of the spouses are 
assessed in light of the standard of living they had during the 
marriage" (citations omitted)]. 
In addition to making this ultimate finding on Sue's 
need for alimony, the trial court made subsidiary findings in 
its ruling from the bench regarding Sue's earnings, earning 
capacity and expenses, and Bob's ability to pay alimony. The 
court found Sue's monthly income from employment to be 
$3,242.42. Tr. 194-195. Contrary to Bob's argument that the 
trial court did not consider Sue's income from other sources, 
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the court then added income from her separate savings and other 
investments of $401 per month, for a total of $3,643.42 per 
month. Tr. 195. The court then reduced her claimed expenses 
from $2,496 per month to $2,300 per month, because of expenses 
attributable to the adult children Sean and Valerie. 
On Bob's side of the equation, the Court took Bob's 
monthly retirement income of $4,225 and added $250 per month in 
separate interest or investment income, for a total of $4,475 
per month. Id. The Court also reduced Bob's claimed expenses 
by $200, to $2,300 per month, based on a determination of what 
would be reasonable post-divorce. Id. 
The Court then went on to consider Sue's education and 
employment, as well as the number of years she had been out of 
the work force (thereby losing the opportunity to climb the 
career ladder), and her ability to earn income from her share 
of the marital property distribution (which is the same as 
Bob's), in evaluating both her present need for income and her 
income needs upon retirement. Tr. 196-198. In light of all of 
these factors, and without imputing any income to Bob from his 
voluntary unemployment, the Court found $500 per month alimony 
to be appropriate. Tr. 198. 
These subsidiary findings are similar to those 
affirmed in Hill v. Hill, supra, where the defendant husband 
also contended that the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings concerning his ability to pay alimony. In response, 
this Court stated: 
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Ms. Hill concedes that the court did not 
make an express finding on Mr. Hill's 
ability to pay, but notes that the court 
fully considered this factor at trial. Mr. 
Hill provided the court with documentation 
concerning his present and historical 
earnings, along with his current expenses. 
The court made several references to Mr. 
Hill's financial condition, evidencing a 
complete understanding of the resources 
available to pay alimony. 
869 P.2d at 966. 
According to the chart on page 18 of Bob's brief, the 
net result of the alimony award was to approximately equalize 
the net monthly income and expenses of the parties, before 
taking into account Bob's child support and SBP obligations. 
However, any amount to be credited to Sue from child support is 
more than offset by the actual costs of raising a teenage 
daughter. (If any error was made by the trial court in 
calculating alimony, it was in attributing equal monthly 
expenses to the parties, despite the fact that Bob has only 
himself to support, while Sue must support both herself and 
Cara, and Sue has more withholdings from her gross salary than 
Bob does from his gross retirement pay. P. Ex. 1; D. Ex. 9.) 
Also, Sue will not receive the benefit of the SBP 
payment until Bob dies (assuming she outlives him). Moreover, 
based on Bob's own calculations, and even without imputation of 
income, there is no question that he has the means to pay the 
alimony, child support and SBP payment ordered by the trial 
court. 
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Bob also argues that because the disability portion of 
his retirement pay is his separate property, it may not be 
taken into account for purposes of calculating alimony, or 
child support. This argument is nonsense, especially in light 
of Bob's own argument that Sue's income from her separate 
property had to be considered. Income from all sources may be 
considered in determining both financial need and ability to 
pay. See, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 
1988). As discussed above, the trial court considered income 
from the separate property of both parties in awarding alimony. 
Moreover, at trial Bob conceded that child support was 
to be calculated based upon his gross retirement pay, including 
the disability component, and that $393 per month in child 
support was appropriate (which the trial court increased by 
only $8.) Ex. "A" to Bob's trial brief (R. 97-121). Page 10 
of his trial brief also conceded that an award of alimony to 
Sue was appropriate (albeit in the amount of $300 per month, 
rather than the $500 actually awarded). 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that even 
with the existing alimony and child support awards, Sue must 
continue to work full time in order to maintain her and her 
daughter's current standa f living, while Bob may maintain 
his current standard of living by remaining idle. On the other 
hand, all Bob has to do to improve his standard of living is 
return to work, while there are no options available to Sue 
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to improve her standard of living (or Cara's). These facts 
suggest that even if no income is imputed to Bob, the alimony 
and child support awards were, if anything, too low. 
V. BOB IS ENTITLED TO NO PART OF SUE'S 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
Bob argues that he is entitled to one-half of the 
retirement benefits Sue earned during the marriage. Of course, 
this argument is undercut by Bob's opposition to an award to 
Sue of one-half of the retirement benefits he earned during the 
marriage. However, even if Sue is awarded her share of his 
retirement benefits, Bob should be awarded no part of her 
benefits. 
At first blush, it would seem reasonable that if Sue 
were awarded a share of Bob's benefits, reciprocity should 
apply. [Indeed, in his Answer to Sue's Complaint at p.2, 1f 8 
(R. 30-32), Bob conceded that Sue should get one-half of his 
benefits and he should get one-half of hers.] However, on the 
facts of this case, reciprocity would be totally inequitable. 
Although Bob was ordered to pay one-half of the amount 
necessary to reinstate Sue's retirement benefits, most of this 
amount is traceable to benefits accrued during her four years 
of employment with the Census Bureau prior to the marriage. 
Sue cashed out these benefits during the marriage and 
contributed the proceeds to the marital estate. Since Bob is 
presumed to have already received one-half of these proceeds, 
it is only fair that he reimburse her for this amount, plus 
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interest, with no right to this portion of her retirement 
benefits once she retires. 
As discussed above, the portion of her retirement 
benefits attributable to her employment during the marriage is 
negligible. However, Bob should receive none of this portion 
either. Sue's retirement benefits are calculated based upon a 
combination of her years of service and average salary. 
Because she was out of the work force for almost 20 years 
during the marriage, her retirement prospects are adversely 
affected in two ways. First, she was unable to work her way up 
the career ladder in terms of salary. Second, she was unable 
to accrue years of service. See, Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 
581, 602 (1989) (dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor). In 
order to accrue the 30 years of service Bob has, she would not 
be able to retire until age 73. 
Given this scenario, it would be unconscionable to 
award Bob any part of Sue's retirement benefits, which already 
will be meager, especially in comparison to his. 
VI. BOB AGREED TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD THE 
CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES. 
Bob's brief correctly points out that under Utah law, 
he cannot be compelled to contribute toward the educational 
expenses of his children after they reach age 18, absent 
special circumstances. What Bob overlooks, however, is his 
agreement to contribute to such expenses. Such agreements are 
enforceable in Utah, even as to children that have reached the 
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age of majority, and may be embodied in a divorce decree. 
Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981); Hill v. Hill, 841 
P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992). 
At trial both Bob and Sue expressed a commitment to 
share the costs of providing each of their children with the 
opportunity to pursue educational opportunities. At Tr. 
128-130 (Add. "A" hereto), Bob testified that he was willing 
and able to contribute both towards Cara's expenses at Judge 
Memorial High School and Valerie's expenses at Westminster 
College. Valerie was over age 18 at the time of trial. 
(Subsequent to trial, Valerie graduated from college. To that 
extent, the issue is moot, leaving for determination the 
question of Cara's college expenses from age 18 through age 22 
and educational costs which may be incurred by Sean, now 20 
years of age.) The trial court took Bob at his word and 
embodied his agreement in the Decree. This Court should also 
enforce that agreement and uphold the Decree. 
VII. THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND ACCOUNT IS 
SUE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
It is undisputed that the Royal Bank of Scotland 
account (about $15,000) is made up entirely of funds received 
by Sue through inheritance from her mother. Tr. 19-21. Sue 
became determined to segregate these funds when she learned 
that Bob had yet another paramour (in addition to his brother's 
wife). Id. Bob does not contend that he augmented these funds 
in any fashion or that they became commingled with marital 
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assets. Accordingly, the trial court correctly awarded Sue's 
separate, inherited funds to Sue. See, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
supra; Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah App. 1991). 
Bob's sole claim to these funds is based on the fact 
that Sue set up the account in which the bonds are held as a 
joint account. This argument is absurd. The name or names put 
on an account does not determine whether it is marital or 
separate property. See, Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 
1986); Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-341 (Utah 1980). 
According to Bob's rationale, a spouse could lay sole claim to 
marital property (for example, the family home) simply by 
withholding the name of the other spouse from documents 
evidencing ownership. The law does not countenance such 
mechanistic and artificial tests to determine whether property 
is subject to distribution upon divorce. 
At page 35 of his brief, Bob goes on to argue that 
establishing the account as a joint account shows that Sue 
"intended for [Bob] to be a recipient of those funds should 
[Sue] die while the parties were still married" (emphasis 
added). Of course, Sue did not die during the marriage, so 
that any such intent is irrelevant. 
Sue did not contribute this asset to the marital 
estate merely by engaging in an estate planning device designed 
to avoid probate. If this were so, a spouse could again lay 
claim to separate assets as marital assets, simply because they 
-21-
were the subject of a bequest to that spouse in the other 
spouse's will. Furthermore, wills and most other estate 
planning devices are revocable, and nothing is more common than 
to remove a divorced spouse as a death beneficiary. 
Finally, at trial, Bob conceded that Sue's 
inheritance, including the Royal Bank of Scotland Account, were 
Sue's separate property, not part of the marital estate, and 
should be awarded to her. See, Bob's trial brief (R. 97-121) 
at pp. 12, 14. 
CONCLUSION 
Bob's cross-appeal is nothing more than an attempt at 
gross overreaching and must be denied. Sue respectfully urges 
that the Decree be affirmed in all respects, except that the 
trial court be directed on remand to award Sue 30% of Bob's 
disposable monthly retired pay, either in the lump sum present 
value amount of $185,000, or as it is paid on a monthly basis. 
Sue would prefer payment on a monthly basis. 
Alternatively, Sue urges this Court to remand to the 
trial court with directions to make findings on the amount of 
income to be imputed to Bob, based on Sue's salary, to find 
that Sue has a 30% property interest in Bob's disposable 
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monthly retired pay, and to reconsider the trial court's option 
nos. 1 and 2 accordingly.^ 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS 
7 MERRILYN SUSAN VARALLO, 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
VS. 
FRANCIS 
PLAINTIFF, 
V. VARALLO, 
DEFENDANT. 
CASE NO. 924701381 
13 BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 17TH AND 18TH 
DAYS OF FEBRUARY, 1993, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE CAME ON 
14 FOR TRIAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, DISTRICT 
JUDGE, FARMINGTON, UTAH. 
15 
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17 
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18 
19 
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21 
22 
RONALD NEHRING 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
CITY CENTRE T, SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
HAROLD J. DENT 
KING, MESERVY & DENT 
2120 S. 1300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106 
23 
24 
25 
JOANNE PRATT, CSR 
HALL OF JUSTICE 
800 WEST STATE STREET 
FARMINGTON, UT 84025 
COPY 
1 Q MRS. VARALLO, MAY I ASK YOU NOW SOME QUEST1UN5 
2 ABOUT YOUR OWN BACKGROUND. COULD YOU BRIEFLY TELL US 
3 SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR EDUCATION? 
4 A I HAVE A BACHELOR'S DEGREE IN ENGLISH FROM THE 
5 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA. 
6 Q IN WHAT AREA WAS YOUR DEGREE TAKEN? 
7 A IN LIBERAL ARTS. 
8 Q WHAT IS YOUR WORK HISTORY? 
9 A I BASICALLY STARTED IN—MOST OF MY WORK 
10 HISTORY HAS BEEN WITH THE FEDERAL SERVICE AND WITH THE 
11 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. AND I STARTED WITH THEM IN JANUARY 
12 OF 1966 ON A TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT WITH NASA AT CAPE 
13 KENNEDY. I WAS THEN PUT ON THE CIVIL SERVICE REGISTER 
14 AND WOUND UP WITH A PERMANENT JOB WITH THE CENSUS BUREAU 
15 IN JUNE OF 1966. I WORKED FOR THE CENSUS BUREAU FOR FOUR 
16 YEARS UNTIL I MARRIED BOB AND LEFT THE CENSUS IN JUNE OF 
17 '70. AFTER THAT I WORKED FOR ABOUT 15 MONTHS WITH THE 
18 DEPARTMENT OF ARMY AT FORTH LEAVENWORTH ON A TEMPORARY 
19 APPOINTMENT. AND THEN I DIDN'T WORK AGAIN FROM MAY OF 
20 1971 UNTIL JANUARY OF 1988 WHEN I WENT BACK TO WORK AT 
21 DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY IN ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. I WORKED 
22 THERE FOR EIGHT MONTHS. AND THEN WE MOVED TO UTAH. I 
23 STAYED OUT OF THE WORK FORCE AGAIN ANOTHER TWO YEARS. 
24 THEN I WENT BACK TO WORK JANUARY OF 1991 FOR THE BUREAU 
25 OF RECLAMATION HERE IN SALT LAKE. 
6 
1 Q DID YOUR HUSBAND HAVE ANY OPINION ABOUT 
2 WHETHER YOU SHOULD BE WORKING DURING THE TIME— DURING 
3 THE EARLY YEARS OF YOUR MARRIAGE? 
4 A HE DID NOT WANT ME TO WORK. WE HAD MADE A 
5 MUTUAL AGREEMENT THAT I SHOULD, IF AT ALL FINANCIALLY 
6 POSSIBLE, I SHOULD STAY HOME WITH THE CHILDREN. THERE 
7 WAS NO REAL QUESTION ABOUT MY BEING ABLE TO GO BACK TO 
8 WORK. IT WAS DIFFICULT WITH THREE KIDS AND NOT A LOT OF 
9 SUPPORT ABOUT IT. 
10 Q WHAT PROMPTED THE RETURN TO WORK IN 1991? 
11 A IN '91. 
12 Q YES. 
13 A OKAY. BOB LEFT UNISYS IN AUGUST OF 1990. AND 
14 IN NOVEMBER OF 1990 HE WAS STILL UNEMPLOYED. SO HE TOLD 
15 ME ONE DAY THAT IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OUR LIFESTYLE I'D 
16 BETTER GET OUT AND FIND A JOB. SO I STARTED LOOKING FOR 
17 A JOB. 
18 Q DID YOU ACCUMULATE ANY RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
19 DURING THE TIME YOU HAD EMPLOYMENT IN THE EARLY YEARS OF 
20 YOUR MARRIAGE? 
21 A MY RETIREMENT SITUATION IS A LITTLE BIT 
22 COMPLICATED. BUT THE TIME THAT I HAD ON TEMPORARY 
23 APPOINTMENTS DOES NOT COUNT TOWARD COMPUTATION OF ANNUITY 
24 FOR CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT PURPOSES. THE FOUR YEARS I 
25 HAD WITH THE CENSUS WHICH WAS THE ONLY TIME THAT I HAD 
1 PERMANENT PRIOR TO 1991, I WITHDREW THE RETIREMENT 
2 CONTRIBUTION AFTER I WAS MARRIED. AND IN ORDER TO GET 
3 CREDIT FOR THAT, I HAVE TO PAY THAT BACK WITH INTEREST. 
4 IN ORDER TO GET CREDIT FOR THE TEMPORARY TIME THAT I'VE 
5 HAD, I HAVE TO PAY INTO THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM—NOT 
6 SOCIAL SECURITY—CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM IN ORDER 
7 TO GET CREDIT FOR THAT TIME ALSO. SO OF THE SEVEN YEARS 
8 AND SEVEN MONTHS THAT I HAVE OF EMPLOYMENT IN FEDERAL 
9 SERVICE, FIVE YEARS AND SEVEN MONTHS ARE NOT COVERED FOR 
10 RETIREMENT PURPOSES UNLESS I PAY BACK $8,511. 
11 Q HAVE YOU RECENTLY REVIEWED THE OBLIGATION THAT 
12 YOU HAVE IN ORDER TO—FOR LACK OF A BETTER TERM— 
13 REINSTATE YOUR RETIREMENT? 
14 A YES. I SENT OFF TO THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 
15 MANAGEMENT AND GOT A NOTICE FROM THEM ON HOW MUCH IT 
16 WOULD COST ME TO COVER ALL THE YEARS OF SERVICE I'M 
17 PRESENTLY UNCOVERED FOR, AND THAT AMOUNT IS $8,511. 
18 Q DO YOU KNOW WHAT LINE OF WORK YOUR HUSBAND HAS 
19 BEEN IN DURING YOUR MARRIAGE TO HIM? 
20 A WHEN WE FIRST MARRIED BOB WAS A MAJOR IN THE 
21 ARMY. HE WAS IN THE INTELLIGENCE AREA. AND HE STAYED IN 
22 THE ARMY AND STAYED IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD UNTIL HE 
23 RETIRED THE FIRST OF MARCH OF 1988. AFTER THAT HE GOT 
24 THE JOB WITH UNISYS HERE IN SALT LAKE IN AUGUST OF 1988. 
25 AND HE WAS THE REGIONAL SECURITY MANAGER FOR UNISYS. 
1 A THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION. 
2 Q OKAY. BUT SEAN DOES HAVE THE SUPERIOR I.Q? 
3 A HE DOES. 
4 Q HE HAS SUCCEEDED AT BOUNTIFUL JR. HIGH SCHOOL? 
5 HE HAS BEEN EMPLOYED? YOU ARE AWARE OF AN EMPLOYMENT 
6 HISTORY? 
7 A UH-HUH. 
8 Q OKAY. THANK YOU, DOCTOR. 
9 MR. NEHRING: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
10 THE COURT: THANK YOU. YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. 
11 MR. NEHRING: WE'RE PREPARED TO RECALL MR. 
12 VARALLO. 
13 CROSS EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. NEHRING: 
15 Q MR. VARALLO, I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE 
16 ANSWERS THAT YOU GAVE TO MR. DENT'S QUESTIONS CONCERNING 
17 EDUCATION. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, YOU TOO PUT A PREMIUM ON 
18 YOUR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION. IS THAT RIGHT? 
19 A YES, I DO. 
20 Q AND YOU HAVE BEEN A WILLING FINANCIAL 
21 CONTRIBUTOR TO THEIR EDUCATION? IS THAT RIGHT, SIR? 
22 A CERTAINLY UP TO THIS DATE, COUNSELOR. 
23 Q AND AS I UNDERSTAND YOUR TESTIMONY THEN, SIR, 
24 BECAUSE EDUCATION IS SOMETHING THAT'S IMPORTANT TO YOU, 
25 YOU WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE FINANCIAL 
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1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONTINUE YOUR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION. IS 
2 THAT RIGHT, SIR? 
3 A THAT DEPENDS, COUNSELOR. 
4 Q WELL, SIR. ISN'T IT TRUE, SIR, THAT BASED ON 
5 YOUR PLACING OF PREMIUM, YOU ARE WILLING TO TAKE OUT YOUR 
6 WALLET AND PUT DOWN MONEY TO CONTINUE, FOR EXAMPLE, 
7 KARA'S EDUCATION AT JUDGE MEMORIAL? IS THAT RIGHT, SIR? 
8 A WELL, IT'S ONE THING, COUNSELOR, TO WANT TO 
9 HAVE YOUR DAUGHTER BENEFIT. IT'S ANOTHER THING TO BE 
10 ABLE TO AFFORD IT WHEN YOU DON'T HAVE THE INCOME, SIR. 
11 OR IT'S PRACTICALITY AND REALITY OF CAN ONE REALLY AFFORD 
12 THE LUXURY OF THE PRIVATE EDUCATION THAT'S BEEN PROVIDED 
13 THUS FAR FOR OUR CHILDREN, BASED ON THE FINANCIAL ABILITY 
14 FOR US TO DO THAT—FOR ME TO DO THAT. OKAY. 
15 Q WELL— 
16 A I THINK A DIVORCE, THE SETTLEMENT OF A DIVORCE 
17 AND THE OUTCOME OF THAT, COUNSELOR, I THINK YOU CAN 
18 REASON THAT COULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON WHAT ONE IS ABLE OR 
19 NOT ABLE TO DO IN TERMS OF THEIR OWN SUSTENANCE AS WELL 
20 AS THEIR OWN CHILDREN'S SUSTENANCE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT 
21 THEY DESIRE FOR THOSE CHILDREN. 
22 Q SIR, YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH YOUR CURRENT 
23 FINANCIAL SITUATION, ARE YOU NOT? 
24 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
25 Q NOW SIR, BASED ON WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT YOUR 
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1 CURRENT FINANCIAL CONDITION, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT YOU HAVE 
2 THE WHEREWITHAL, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION YOUR WIFE'S 
3 FINANCIAL CONDITION, TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO KEEP KARA 
4 AT JUDGE MEMORIAL? YES OR NO? 
5 A AS OF THE 17TH OF FEBRUARY AND 18TH OF 
6 FEBRUARY 1993, THAT'S CORRECT. 
7 Q YOU WOULD? 
8 A AS OF TODAY, COUNSELOR. 
9 Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, A SIMILAR QUESTION FOR 
10 VALERIE AT WESTMINSTER. BASED ON THE CURRENT STATE OF 
11 AFFAIRS OF YOUR RESPECTIVE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS, ARE YOU 
12 IN A POSITION TO MAKE A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO KEEPING 
13 VALERIE AT WESTMINSTER THROUGH GRADUATION? 
14 A THE SAME ANSWER APPLIES, COUNSELOR. 
15 Q OKAY. THE SECOND LINE OF QUESTIONING THAT MR. 
16 DENT POSED TO YOU CONCERNED ALLEGATIONS MADE IN OUR TRIAL 
17 BRIEF. AND I'M NOT GOING TO QUIBBLE WITH YOU ON THE 
18 DEFINITION OF WORDS. BUT I WANT TO KNOW THE STUFF. YOU 
19 DID HAVE AN AFFAIR WITH YOUR SISTER-IN-LAW. IS THAT 
20 RIGHT, SIR? 
21 A IN 1987. 
22 Q AND YOU DID HAVE AN AFFAIR WITH A WOMAN NAMED 
23 ROXANNE FOX. IS THAT RIGHT, SIR? 
24 A COUNSELOR, I WISH YOU WOULD CLARIFY AT THIS 
25 TIME WHAT YOUR INTERPRETATION OR DEFINITION OF AFFAIR IS. 
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